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The book contains also a brief appendix in which Cassirer offers some
further reflections on St. Paul's relationship to his fellow Jews, an index of
biblical references, and a sonnet by Grace Luckin composed at the time of
Cassirer's death on February 20, 1979, which appears as the book's frontispiece. Thomas F. Torrance, according to editor Ronald Weitzman, was instrumental in helping to bring the manuscript of this book to final publication,
as well as the late Rev. Dr. Eric Abbott, the former Dean of Westminster,
who described Heinz Cassirer as "sui generis" and persisted in urging that
his later writings and translations must be published.
Grace and Law offers an altogether fascinating and instructive study. For
anyone the least bit interested in the problems of ethics or moral theology,
or in the practical philosophy of Kant, or in Pauline theology of grace and
law and its Old Testament background, this book would make profitable
reading.

God, Suffering, and Solipsism, by Clement Dore. New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1989. Pp. x and 120, $35.00 cloth.
JAMES A. KELLER, Wofford College
This slim volume provides an argument against the skeptical thesis that no
one is justified in believing that there exists an external world beyond the
present states of that individual's consciousness. Its strategy is similar to
Descartes' way of resolving a similar doubt in his Meditations: first, establish
that God (a being than which no greater being is logically possible) exists;
and second, show that this truth, along with certain others that do not depend
on the assumption that an external world exists, entail that such a world exists.
But though this overall strategy is reminiscent of Descartes, the arguments
are much more fully developed than Descartes' and differ from his in several
important ways.
As one would suspect from the purpose of the book as well as from the
characterization of God given above, the one argument for the existence of
God which Dore discusses is the ontological argument. The first four chapters
are devoted to articulating and defending certain versions of it. Chapter 1
presents a modal version. But it leaves undefended the claim that God as
defined in the argument is a logically possible being. Dore employs two
strategies to defend this claim: in Chapter 2 he provides a non-modal ontological argument, which does not depend on the assumption that God is a
logically possible being; and in Chapter 4 he explicitly defends the claim that
God is a logically possible being. Chapter 3 is devoted to a critique of what
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Dore calls parodies of the ontological argument; such parodies are attempts
like Gaunilo's to show that the argument must be fallacious by constructing
arguments with similar form to show that such entities as "minor deities," a
"Super-Satan," and a "maximally nutritious food" must exist. Dore attempts
to refute each of these by showing that the purported entity is not logically
possible.
Dore next turns to a defense of the claim that God exists against what he
calls the most formidable argument against it: the atheistic argument from
suffering. He considers two versions of the free-will defense-those of
Plantinga (in Chapter 5) and of Hick (in Chapter 6), agreeing with them at
points and supplementing them at others. He finds that they have some plausibility, but he later concludes that they are not the best defense against the
argument from suffering. So Dore proposes (in Chapter 7) a different line of
defense: all the evil that occurs is "logically necessary for indiscernible,
valuable ends" (p. 71). The defense of this claim against various objections
leads to its fuller and more precise reformulation. He claims that there is
some one great good E for which the following complex state of affairs is
logically necessary: "the for-the-most-part unimpeded operation of scientific
laws on the matter which the universe contains" (p. 73) plus "virtuous free
choices having to do with suffering" (p. 80)-i.e., free choices which may
be made in such a way as to be virtuous, but which necessarily involve a
capacity for wrongdoing that frequently gives rise to suffering. Dore points
out that this last condition does not depend on the free-will defense, for it
does not presuppose that free will itself is a great enough good to outweigh
suffering; Dore's claim instead is that it is logically necessary for E. This
line of defense also plays a key role in Dore's argument against skepticism.
In Chapter 8 Dore first explicitly discusses perceptual skepticism. He states
an argument for it and notes that it depends on the claim that all we are ever
non-inferentially aware of, even in veridical perceptions (if there are any), is
seeming perceptions. Since this is itself a controversial thesis, Dore defends
it against various analyses of "seeming to perceive" which deny that this
concept refers to an experience involved in all perception. For example, he
considers the suggestions that "I seem to see" is equivalent to "Maybe 1 see"
or to "I am inclined to doubt that 1 see."
Having argued that perceptual skepticism is a genuine problem, not to be
dismissed by linguistic analysis, Dore provides his own response (in Chapter
9), drawing together a number of considerations from earlier chapters. The
essential strategy of this chapter is this. "God exists" and "My suffering
exists" are both knowable without presupposing the existence of an external
world and appear to be logically inconsistent. Their consistency can be saved
by positing that there is some valuable end which God wishes to obtain and
for which my suffering is logically necessary. But Dore had earlier argued
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for the truth of the proposition that "It is frequently morally admissible for
me to avoid suffering if possible and to attempt to relieve it when it occurs."
Yet this proposition appears inconsistent with the claim that "My suffering
is logically necessary for a valuable end which God wants to obtain." Dore
argues that the best way of resolving this seeming inconsistency makes reference to an external world.
Dore's book, though brief, is not easy. His arguments are often complex
and subtle. And they deal with several diverse topics-the ontological argument and the argument from suffering as well as perceptual skepticism. Cartesian-like arguments against perceptual skepticism are not common today,
so I have tried to indicate in some detail the course of his argument, for his
book may be of interest to people who are interested in the ontological
argument or the problem of evil rather than in perceptual skepticism.
One might ask two different sorts of questions in evaluating Dore's book:
(1) Are there significant points where his argument needs further elaboration
or defense? and (2) Even if there are not, what has Dore accomplished? I
shall respond to the latter question first. Because Dore has constructed an
argument against perceptual skepticism which does not presuppose any
knowledge of an external world, has he constructed an a priori argument
against it? No, for his argument (i) depends on the knowledge that he suffers
and (ii) takes the form of a claim that the hypothesis that an external world
exists is part of the best explanation of how certain apparently inconsistent
propositions, which do not involve an external world, can be reconciled.
Since it also depends on knowing (or at least being justified in believing)
certain moral propositions, it presupposes that the truth of these propositions
can be known without presupposing the existence of an external world. For
these reasons, he has also not constructed an argument which purports to
show that it is logically necessary that perceptual skepticism is false. What
he does claim to have done is to have provided an argument which increases
the plausibility of the hypothesis that there is an external world (p. 110). But
whether, and to what extent, it increases the plausibility of that hypothesis
depends on whether, and to what extent, its premises (and its reasoning) are
more plausible than other reasons for rejecting perceptual skepticism. That
plausibility itself depends largely on Dore's success in establishing certain
points in earlier chapters which are essential steps in his overall argument.
This brings us to what I termed the first question, which concerns the details
of his argument.
It seems to me that there are a number of places where important points in
his argument are either undefended or insufficiently defended. Of course, one
could make this claim about any philosophical work, but the brevity and the
scope of this book combine to make this problem more serious than in many
other books. For example, Dore admits that his argument to prove that God
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is possible depends on his being able to refute the idea that "exist" is not a
descriptive predicate, but he devotes only about a page to refuting this common idea (p. 19). His strategy is to claim that "exist" seems descriptive when
the grammatical subject is a proper name and that the burden of proof is on
his opponent to show that "exist" has a different meaning when the grammatical subject is a common noun. But when we consider the point of saying
"Ronald Reagan exists" (his example), we may well conclude that "exist"
here does make a different point (have a different meaning) than it does in
"Cows exist." Frequently his argument turns on undefended claims about
what is better and on assumptions about what is logically possible. He asserts
that God is greater if it is logically impossible for any being to come close
to God in the number and degree of its perfections (p. 24). (To counter the
claim that God is greater if God could create such a being, he replies that
doing so would lessen God's perfection. It is not obvious to me that this is
so. I wonder too how one individuates God's perfections.) His argument in
Chapter 4 depends on defining a number of artificial concepts; I suspect that
Dore's opponent would doubt the logical possibility of these concepts, but
Dore never considers this problem. Certainly, my asking these questions does
not show that Dore is wrong in any of these claims, but I do think it shows
that he might well have devoted more attention to their defense.

The Specter of the Absurd, by Donald A. Crosby. Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1988. Pp. IX and 456, $59.50 (cloth), $19.95 (paper).

LOUIS DUPRE, Yale University
This insightful, balanced, and clearly written study of the intellectual sources
of modern nihilism stands out by the width of its range. In the first part the
author distinguishes no less than five different types of nihilism. Political
nihilism began in the revolutionary societies of mid-nineteenth century Russia; moral nihilism rejects all moral principles or denies that they can be
rationally justified; epistemological nihilism either relativizes truth claims or
denies even commonality of meaning among different cultures; cosmic nihilism assumes the cosmos to be devoid of intrinsic intelligibility or at least of
human value; to existential nihilism, the most fundamental and in common
usage often the only known type, human existence itself appears absurd. All
of these varieties are duly illustrated by texts taken from representative philosophical or literary sources. Obviously, then, this study extends the limits
of its subject well beyond the traditional definition. By more conventional
standards most of what the author describes as epistemological nihilism and

